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Abstract
In this paper we explore theoretically the relationship between explicit and
implicit/relational contracting distinguishing between the ex-ante decision to sign
an explicit contract and the ex-post decision wheter to actually apply it. We
show, among other things, that the relational eﬃcient explicit contract tends to
display overcontracting on tasks or qualitative requirements (A) that are verifi-
able but apparently of little use for the principal. The ex-post (non)implementation
of such explicit contract can then be discretionally exchanged against the pro-
vision of non contractible tasks (B) that are highly valuable for the principal.
An empirical implication of the result, consistent with casual observation in pro-
curement, is that penalties for infringements established by explicit contracts are
seldom exercised, even though violations take place and are easy to monitor and
verify.
1 Introduction
The puzzles. Since Kerr’s (1974) amusing list of examples and Holmstrom and
Milgrom’s (1991) pioneering analysis, it is well known that explicit contracts often
reward low value (if not dysfunctional) easy-to-verify tasks at the expense of more
valuable but hard to monitor ones. It is probably less well known that often real world
parties do not enforce explicitly contracted provisions (e.g. do not impose penalties for
contractual infringements) even though, by doing so, they apparently forego substantial
∗For helpful comments, we wish to thank Sumon Bhaumik, Christopher Hellwig, Paul Grout, Bruno
Jullien, Patrick Rey, Stephane Saussier and seminar participants at ATOM Centre, Brunel University
and at the Workshop on Public-Private Partnerships in Bristol.
†Dept of Economics and Finance, Brunel University; DEI, University of Rome Tor Vergata, CMPO
and CEDI.
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gains. The puzzle is therefore twofold: Why tasks of little value are often contractually
specified? Why penalties for noncompliance are often not exercised?
Examples abound. In many organizations, the employees are contractually required
to arrive at work every day at a certain time and to stay until another time, under the
threat of losing the job. This is of little value for the organization when physical pres-
ence does not facilitate monitoring and the task can be as eﬃciently performed at home
(think about creative non-team tasks). And many organizations then do not enforce
these contractual provisions but allow instead flexible working hours. Similarly, in the
academia, professors’ contracts often establish a minimum number of teaching hours
and other duties that the researcher is required to undertake. However, universities
do not always apply these provisions: individual teaching loads are often reduced even
when this requires to pay for extra teaching staﬀ. In public procurement, penalties
for noncompliance with contractual obligations are often waived: for example, a recent
inquiry found that penalties for low quality provision by contractors procuring goods
and services to Italian public administrations were imposed for less that 5% of the as-
certained violations.1 Analogous anecdotal evidence exists for procurement of complex
services in the UK (see below).
This paper. This paper provides an ’optimistic’ joint explanation for these puz-
zling observations by analyzing the interaction between explicit and relational contracts
from a novel perspective, one emphasizing the diﬀerence between the ex ante decision
to sign an explicit contract and that of actually applying it ex post.
In an important recent contribution, Bernheim and Whinston (1998) emphasize
that relational contracting needs discretion to punish defections and that, because of
this, strategic ambiguity or in our wording undercontracting may be eﬃcient. Avoiding
to contractually regulate some valuable and contractible tasks may be optimal since
discretion may facilitate punishment and thus cooperation on valuable non-contractible
tasks. We show here that, if we take into account the possibility not to apply an
explicit contract, then overcontracting - i.e. contractually requiring apparently low
value verifiable tasks (or actions, or levels of eﬀort) - may become the optimal strategy
to facilitate relational contracting on valuable but non-contractible ones.
Our model shows that explicit contracts on the provision of very costly and com-
pletely valueless tasks may not be enforced in equilibrium but used as eﬀective ’threats’
1Own calculations on data from the third party inspections commissioned by the Italian Public
Procurement Agency (Consip) and coordinated by their team in charge of monitoring supply contracts
(Team Monitoraggio delle Forniture). In particular, in the period 2005-2008 on a total of 4095 in-
spections a total of 1455 contractual infringement by the contractor were ascertained, but contractual
remedies/penalties where only exercised in 64 of those cases, i.e. against about 4.42% of the infringe-
ments (with no significant diﬀerence across types of public administrations or geographical location,
typically important in Italy because of diﬀerences in Social Capital). See Albano et al. (2008) for
a general discussion (in Italian) of the possible reasons behind such low contract enforcement rate,
besides the ’benevolent’ one discussed in this paper.
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that facilitate relational contracting on crucial but non contractible tasks. With over-
contracting on tasks that are verifiable, costly to the agent but of no use for the
principal, the principal can exchange discretionally the non-implementation of such
explicit contract against the provision of noncontractible tasks that are costly to the
agent and valuable for the principal. The principal designs the explicit contract by
requiring the agent to do more than what he actually needs him to do on the verifiable
task. The principal further informally specifies what the agent needs to do on the
unverifiable task. The principal and the agent then agree not to enforce the explicit
contract on the verifiable task as long as the agent does what the principal requires him
to do on the unverifiable task. In order to reduce his own incentives to deviate from
the implicit agreement and enforce the contract on the verifiable task, the principal
chooses a verifiable task that is costly to the agent to undertake but brings little or no
benefit to himself. The optimal relational contract thus exhibits (over)contracting on
the valueless tasks.
This reasoning oﬀers a rationale for the puzzles discussed earlier: organizations do
not enforce contractual provisions on working hours for committed and collaborative
employees but might apply them to punish/fire employees that exploited their acquired
freedom opportunistically. Universities accommodate teaching reductions for professors
who excel in research or are particularly collaborative on other activities that are
hard to specify in a contract or verify for a court. In case of opportunistic behaviour
however, the application of the explicit contract might be used as a sanction against
the professor.2 Parties involved in a long term relationship may not levy explicitly
contracted penalties for infringements that do take place if that helps them not to
improve collaboration on non-contractible aspects of their relationship. In procurement
of complex services in the UK "There exists anecdotal evidence that the public sector
can sometimes be reluctant to levy deductions for fear of spoiling the relationship with
the private sector" (HM Treasury, 2006)3
2Following only what prescribed by the explicit contract can in fact be an eﬀective weapon (hence
threat) in the hands of unions when bargaining for higher wages. These “work to rule” (also named
’Italian strike’, as it was apparently invented in Italy early in the previous century, or ’white strike’),
have been used for example in the US automobile industry, where collective employment agreements
for rather simple tasks are thousands of pages long, and contract enforcement is very eﬃcient. See
http://libcom.org/organise/work-to-rule for a nice up-to-date explanation from direct users, where one
also reads the following: "Almost every job is covered by a maze of rules, regulations, standing orders,
and so on, many of them completely unworkable and generally ignored. Workers often violate orders,
resort to their own techniques of doing things, and disregard lines of authority simply to meet the goals
of the company. There is often a tacit understanding, even by the managers whose job it is to
enforce the rules, that these shortcuts must be taken in order to meet targets on time." (Bold our).
3The use of relational contracting is also stated clearly in the policy document: “The Government
believes that the relationship between the public and private sector in a PFI project must always
ultimately be contractual but should be overlaid with partnership working to ensure that operations
are eﬀective. In order to encourage this approach the Government will promote the development of
a partnership agreement or shared vision document that sits outside of the actual PFI contract. This
3
An important feature of overcontracting on a costly and valueless action is that it
gives the option to the principal to react immediately to a deviation by the agent, by
levying a fine for noncompliance with the explicit contract. This helps to discipline
one party (the agent) without increasing the temptation to defect by the other (the
principal) and thus transform simultaneous transactions into sequential ones. It follows
that overcontracting has distributional implications: a principal with bargaining power
can implement the eﬃcient relational contract without leaving any rent to the agent
and without using discretionary bonuses.
Of course, as for other ineﬃcient contractual devices increasing punishments, the
possibility of renegotiation at low cost tends to undermine the benefit of overcontract-
ing as mechanism device to sustain relational contracting. In fact we show that the
gain from overcontracting is smaller the lower the cost of renegotiating the contract.
However, in our model, renegotiation does not completely undermine the benefit of
overcontracting. Even when renegotiation costs are zero, overcontracting brings the
benefit of reducing incentives to defect from the implicit agreement by transforming
simultaneous-move games into sequential-move games. For this reason we find that
overcontracting weakly dominates relational contracting where incentives are provided
only through discretionary monetary transfers.
Finally, our paper oﬀers a new explanation as to why penalties for contract infringe-
ment are often quite low, even though eﬀective enforcement of contracted obligations
would suggest to set them rather high (Becker 1968, Abreu 1988). In our model,
increasing penalty for non compliance by the agent reduces the agent’s incentive to
defect but it raises the principal’s one. In order not to tighten the principal’s incentive
constraint, with overcontracting contractual penalties for infringements are optimally
bounded above by the cost of the contracted action for the agent.
Our results are general, but are particularly relevant for large firms and public or-
ganizations subject to what we call ‘bureaucratic control’, i.e. formal accountability
rules that do not allow their members to operate discretionary monetary payments that
have no verifiable counterpart, like an explicit supply contract that justifies the pay-
ment. Bureaucratic control thus hinders ‘standard’ relational contracting. However,
while checking the correspondence between contracts and payments for auditors is rel-
atively easy, verifying whether the explicit contract has then been eﬀectively executed,
whether the promised level of quality of service has been met, and if not, whether con-
tractual remedies have been eﬀectively exercised, is much more diﬃcult. Bureaucratic
control thus does not hinder relational contracting sustained through overcontracting
and without using discretionary transfers.
We wrote above that our is an ’optimistic’ explanation for why explicit contracts
are often not applied, since we focus on benevolent actors and the enforcement of ’pro-
would not be legally binding but would set out the parameters of the public sector and private sector
working relationship and spell out in some detail how the contract will be managed in practice.” Thus
an (explicit) contract is written but another (implicit) contract is implemented.
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ductive’ noncontractible tasks B. However, all our results can readily be re-interpreted
from a less optimistic point of view, with the principal being a ‘non-benevolent’ agent of
a large firm or public organization exploiting his discretion to extract B, reinterpreted
as ’Bribes’ or ’private Benefits’, in exchange for not enforcing the explicit contract
between his organization and outsiders. As nonverifiable tasks, illegal gains must be
part of a self-enforcing relational contracts and discretion on the ex-post execution of
explicit contracts helps to enforce legal/productive as well as illegal/corrupt informal
exchanges (see e.g. Kelman, 1990 and Banfield, 1975).
Relation to the literature. These results can be seen as a contribution to the
economics of ’multi-tasking and job design’, sparked by the seminal work of Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1991). That paper stressed, among other things, that when some tasks
are easy to monitor and to contract upon, whilst others are diﬃcult or impossible,
providing high powered incentives on the easily monitored tasks may lead agents to
disregard the hard to monitor ones which can be crucial to the organization. The
implication is that when the hard to monitor tasks are important it is then better
to limit the power of incentives on easily monitored tasks. This formal result has
been often related to Kerr’s (1975) classic management science piece on "the folly
of rewarding A when aiming for B". On the contrary, our results show that when
one recognizes that signing and applying explicit contracts are distinct decisions, high
powered incentive contracting on almost valueless tasks or quality dimensions (A) turn
out to be the best way to sustain a relationship and obtain eﬀort on other valuable
tasks (B) that are observable but not contractible.
Our work is also related to various strands of literature focussing on implicit or
relational contracts.
Cooperative relationships sustained by "the shadow of the future" are a funda-
mental governance mechanism for most forms of economic interaction and the rich
long-standing literature on implicit or relational contracts reflects their importance.
Scholars like Simon (1951), Macaulay (1963), Klein and Leﬄer (1981) and Telser (1981)
stressed early that when economic transactions are not isolated but episodes of a his-
tory of frequent exchanges, informal agreements sustained by future gains form the
long-term relationships will govern crucial aspects of the exchanges. The formal theory
of implicit or relational contracts has then been developed by Bull (1987) and MacLeod
and Malcomson (1989, 1998) and it has been considerably extended more recently by
Levin (2003), MacLeod (2003), and Fuchs (2007).4
On the other hand, relational contracts are often embedded in a framework of ex-
plicit contracts on verifiable dimensions and the complex interaction between explicit
and relational contracts is somewhat less well understood. Pearce and Stacchetti (1998)
show that with coexisting explicit and implicit contracts a risk neutral principal will
4See also Calzolari and Spagnolo (2007) for an extension to multiple agents and competitive pro-
curement, and MacLeod (2007) for an elegant survey of this literature.
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adjust the discretionary bonuses of the implicit agreement to further insure the risk
averse agent, smoothing his income across periods. We know from Baker et al. (1994)
and Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995) that eﬀective explicit contracting may hinder rela-
tional contracts by improving parties’ fallback position when the relationships break
down after defections (softening the punishment that disciplines the relational con-
tract and making explicit and relational contracts substitutes). More closely related
to our paper, Baker et al. (1994) also show that there are circumstances in which the
presence of an explicit contract facilitates implicit ones, so that explicit and implicit
contracts complement each other. Closely related to our paper, besides the already
discussed work by Bernheim and Whinston (1998), is also the informal work of Klein
(2000), and the more recent work of Baker et al. (2006).5 Klein (2000) suggests that
although relational contracts are indeed crucial for the smooth functioning of organi-
zations, as non-contractible performance dimensions are present in diﬀerent measure
in every economic exchange, parties care a lot for the explicit contracts that constitute
the framework within which relational contracts develop. In particular, he suggests
that explicit contracts are designed with the explicit aim of facilitating relational ones,
by limiting temptations to defect. Baker et al. (2006) formalize this argument in a
relational contracting model with explicitly contracted allocation of valuable decision
rights (governance structures) crucial for adaptation. They show that the eﬃcient al-
location to implement a decision rule minimizes the maximum aggregate temptation
to renege on it.
The structure of the paper. Section 2.1 presents a simple stylized model to
make our points. As in most previous work on relational contracts, in our analysis we
assume that agents (employees) are risk neutral. Tasks may be diﬀerently costly and
are independent in an agent’s cost function. Thus assigning more than one task to the
agent does not aﬀect the cost for the agent of carrying out an individual task. The
principal can observe the agent’s eﬀort but performance cannot be verified. Thus, it
is not possible to write an explicit contract that rewards the agent on the basis of his
performance. Section 2.2 studies the benchmark of ‘standard’ relational contracting,
allowing for both sequential and simultaneous timing. Section 3 analyzes overcontract-
ing in large firms and organizations subject to ‘bureaucratic control’, i.e. to limits in
discretionary payments aimed at improving agents accountability, but making it hard
for them to sustain standard relational contracts with suppliers. Section 4 analyzes
the general case (no bureaucratic control), showing that in our set up overcontracing
is generally optimal, as it facilitate relational contracts by transforming simultaneous
transactions into sequential ones and by strengthening punishments following devia-
tions. Section 5 considers renegotiation costs and short term contracting, showing that
5Somewhat less directly related is the work of Garvey (1995), Halonen (2002), Baker et al. (2001),
Bragelien (2003) and Blonski and Spagnolo (2004) analyzing how a diﬀerent institution, property rights
on specific assets, interact with relational contracts.
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the facilitating eﬀect of overcontracting on relationships never disappears. Section 6
briefly concludes.
2 A Very Simple Model
To make our point in the simplest possible environment, we focus on a very stylized
principal-agent game. It will become apparent however that our results generalize to
more complex situations such as bilateral holdup problems.
2.1 Basic Setup
We consider a long term (infinite horizon), bilateral, repeated interaction between a
principal and an agent. Time is discrete and both parties discount future payoﬀs
through a common and strictly positive factor δ < 1. Let cJ(j) denote the agent’s
increasing and convex cost function of providing a certain level j of eﬀort in task (or
good, service, investment of type) J = A,B,C..., and let vJ(j) denote the weakly
concave increasing value accruing to the principal when receiving intensity j of task
J from the agent. Denote by wJ the per-period surplus generated by the exchange of
J against a monetary transfer or price pj paid by the principal to the agent, wJ =
vJ(j) − cJ(j), and let WJ =
∞X
τ=1
δτwτ . Denote by j¯ > 0 the maximum level of task
intensity solving wJ(j¯) = 0. Both the principal and the agent are risk neutral.6 In the
basic model, they receive zero if they choose not to trade.
Consider a verifiable task, say A. In the absence of special regulations to govern
the exchange of a verifiable task A, the parties have three alternatives.
First, they can write a (long or short-term) court-enforced explicit contract spec-
ifying the principal’s due payment pA, the agent’s obligation to perform intensity a,
and fines (including any repayments, damages, etc.) FP and Fα that a non-performing
party must pay to the other.
Second, they can informally agree on an implicit relational contract to perform a
and to pay an informal monetary transfer tA.
Third, they can use a mix of the two instruments (e.g. an explicitly contracted
minimum level and an implicitly agreed eﬀective level of payment).
If, instead, a task is not verifiable, then an explicit contract cannot be enforced
by courts and only an implicit contract can govern its exchange, like a self-enforcing
relational contract specifying the principal’s due payment, the agent’s obligation to
perform, and some punishment phase triggered by a party’s non-performance.
6Linearity in income is a convenient semplification and, with no uncertainty in the model, the
degree of risk aversion plays no role.
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The relationship between the principal and the agent can thus be characterized
by some verifiable (and court-enforceable) ingredients, e.g. the terms of an explicit
contract on a verifiable task (task intensity a, the corresponding per-period contracted
price pA, the fines for the agent’s non-performance Fα), and by non-verifiable ingre-
dients, the self-enforcing part of the agreement on non-verifiable (and, possibly, some
verifiable) tasks and bonuses/transfers.
We let ω =
©
xP , xα, FP , Fα
ª
denote a generic one-period explicit contract, where
xP , and , xα are the (vector of) actions or payment required by contract from the
principal and the agent, FP and Fα are the (vectors of) fines for non-performance,
and Ω =
©
xP , xα, FP , Fα
ª
is the long term version of the contract, such that ω applies
every period in the future (unless it is renegotiated/modified).
In the basic model we assume that the principal and the agent can commit to a
long-term contract (or that, equivalently, renegotiation cost is very high). We relax
this assumption in Section 5 where we study the eﬀect of renegotiation.
The timing of the game between the principal and the agent can be either simulta-
neous or sequential.7
TIMING(S)
period 0: The principal and the agent may sign an explicit contract and/or agree on
an implicit/relational contract.
period 1: An infinite repetition of (one of) the following stage game(s) takes place:
Stage Game 1 (simultaneous actions)
Step 1: The principal pays any explicitly contracted transfers.
Step 2: The principal and the agent simultaneously choose verifiable and non-
verifiable actions and the implicitly contracted transfer.
Step 3: The principal observes the agent 0s actions and, if the agent violated the
explicit contract, chooses whether or not to impose fines Fα.
Step 4: The principal and the agent may sign new short term contracts or - when
feasible - renegotiate existing long term ones.
Stage Game 2 (sequential, the principal moves first)
7Simultaneous actions may not be realistic when one party only operates monetary transfer. How-
ever, our results apply to more general settings where both parties’ actions may be observable with
delay, like bilateral specific investment.
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Step 1: The principal pays any explicitly and implicitly contracted transfers.
Step 2: The agent observes the transfers and chooses verifiable and non-verifiable
actions (including exercising the fine FP in case the principal violated the explicit
contract).
Step 3: The principal observes the agent 0s actions and, if the agent violated the
explicit contract, chooses whether or not to impose the fines Fα.
Step 4: The principal and the agent may sign new short term contracts or - when
feasible - renegotiate existing long term ones.
Stage Game 3 (sequential, the agent moves first)
Step 1: The agent chooses verifiable and non-verifiable actions.
Step 2: The principal pays any explicitly and implicitly contracted transfers, ob-
serves the agent 0s actions and, if the agent violated the explicit contract, chooses
whether or not to impose the fines Fα.
Step 3: The agent exercises the fine FP in case the principal violated the explicit
contract.
Step 4: The principal and the agent may sign new short term contracts or - when
feasible - renegotiate existing long term ones.
We will consider the relationship between explicit and implicit contracts in this
simple model under diﬀerent assumptions on the institutional framework, like explicit
contracting possibilities, distribution of bargaining power, renegotiation costs, and the
presence or not of what we will call Bureaucratic Control. The term "Bureaucratic
Control" is used to refer to organizational rules that forbid payments that are not part
of an explicit contract; these rules are present in practically all large organizations to
facilitate accounting controls through book auditing.
Before ending this section, consider the first best level of task b, bFB. This maximizes
vB(b)−cB(b)
1−δ leading to
v0B(bFB) = c
0
B(bFB).
2.2 Benchmark: Standard Relational Contracting
When a task B is non-verifiable, explicit contracting is not possible at time 0 and a
relational contract is the only potential alternative. The principal and the agent can
agree on an implicit, relational contract requiring each period the agent to undertake
task B at level b and the principal to operate a discretionary transfer tB, with equilib-
rium per-period payoﬀs {tB − cB(b), vB(b)− tB} . The principal uses grim strategies:
if the agent deviates, the principal will withhold payment forever in the future. The
agent also uses grim strategies: if the principal deviates, the agent will never exert
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eﬀort again in the future. We refer to this type of relational contracting, based on the
use of discretionary transfers, as "standard relational contracting" (ST).
The principal and the agent will accept to participate to the contract if their respec-
tive expected payoﬀ is non-negative, which gives the following participation constraints
IRST − P : V = vB(b)− tB
1− δ ≥ 0 (1)
and
IRST − α : U = tB − cB(b)
1− δ ≥ 0. (2)
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for (IRST-P) and (IRST-α) is that: tB ∈ [cB(b), vB(b)] .
Given this, whether an implicit contract can be sustained in equilibrium depends,
among other things, on the timing of the stage game.
Consider first the case of simultaneous actions, i.e. Stage Game 1. With a
relational contract, the principal would stick to the agreed strategy of paying informal
transfer tB in the current period if defecting is less profitable than sticking to the
equilibrium strategy. By defecting and withholding the payment, the principal saves
tB in the current period but foregoes the surplus
δ(vB(b)−tB)
1−δ in all subsequent periods,
given that, following the defection, the agent will choose not to exert eﬀort again in
the future. The relational incentive constraint of the principal (RICST-P) is then given
by
RICST − P : V = vB(b)− tB
1− δ ≥ vB(b), (3)
which is necessary and suﬃcient condition for the principal not to defect.
Note that an implication of (RICST-P) is that the transfer paid by the principal
to the agent must not be too high, i.e. tB ≤ δvB(b), that is, under standard relational
contracting, the principal must enjoy a rent in each period of at least
VSml(b) ≡ (1− δ)vB(b).
Consider now the relational incentive constraint of the agent (RIC-α) which is
necessary and suﬃcient condition for the agent not to defect. With standard relational
contract, the agent would stick to the agreed strategy of exerting eﬀort b if defecting
is less profitable than sticking to equilibrium strategies. By defecting and not exerting
eﬀort, the agent saves the cost cB(b) of undertaking the task for the principal in the
current period but he foregoes the surplus tB − cB(b) in all subsequent periods, which
amount to δ(tB−cB(b))
1−δ , given that following the defection the principal will choose not
to pay tB again in the future. We then have
RICST − α : U = tB − cB(b)
1− δ ≥ tB (4)
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and we note that to induce the agent to stick to the relational contract, the agent must
receive a transfer tB ≥ cB(b)/δ, that is he must enjoy a rent in each period of at least
USml(b) ≡
(1− δ) cB(b)
δ
.
The Lemma below then derives the set of sustainable relational contracts that
satisfies (IRST-P), (IRST-α), (RICST-P) and (RICST-α) with simultaneous timing.
Lemma 1 (Standard Relational Contracting with Simultaneous Timing) With
demand for a single non-verifiable task and no explicit contracting on other tasks, if
actions are simultaneous, a relational contract to sustain positive levels of the non-
contractible task is sustainable in equilibrium iﬀ:
ΦSTSml (b, δ) ≡ δ2vB(b)− cB(b) ≥ 0. (5)
Proof. The set of feasible relational contracts with standard relational contract-
ing maximizes b subject to the two participation constraints, (IRST-P) and (IRST-α)
and the two relational constraints, (RICST-P) and (RICST-α). When (RICST-P) and
(RICST-α) are satisfied, (IRST-P) and (IRST-α) are also satisfied, thus we can ignore
(IRST-P) and (IRST-α). Summing across (RICST-P) and (RICST-α), we obtain a nec-
essary condition for the relational incentive constraints to hold, the global relational
incentive constraint (RIC), given by
RICST : δvB(b)− cB(b) (1− δ)− tB ≥ 0. (6)
Since the LHS of RIC is decreasing in tB, the set of sustainable b minimizes tB subject
to (RICST-P) and (RICST-α). This gives tB =
cB(b)
δ which is the value of tB such that
(RICST-α) is binding. Substituting for this value in (RICST-P), we obtain expression
(5).
Through the use of discretionary transfers tB, relational contracting can be help
motivating the agent when explicit contracting is not possible. For given δ, any task
intensity b ≤ bSml (δ) , where
bSTSml (δ) =
1
ΦSTSml (δ)
,
can be sustained under simultaneous timing through standard relational contracting.
Since ΦSTSml (.) is increasing in δ, the upper bound b
ST
Sml (δ) implementable through an
implicit contract is increasing in δ. For δ suﬃciently high, the first best intensity bFB
is sustainable. To put it diﬀerently, the minimum level of δ that is needed to ensure
sustainability of first best intensity solves
δSTSml (bFB) =
1
ΦSTSml (bFB, δ)
< 1.
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The inequality holds since ΦSTSml (bFB, δ) is always positive for δ = 1 and negative
for δ = 0 and since ΦSml (b, δ) is increasing in δ.
When the timing of the exchange is sequential as in Stage Game 2, there are no
gains from defection for the principal: as the principal moves first, deviating by not
paying the transfer tB is not profitable as the agent will not deliver b. The only poten-
tially profitable deviation is the one of the agent, which implies that the only relevant
relational incentive constraint is (RIC-α). The following Lemma is then obtained:
Lemma 2 (Standard Relational Contracting with Sequential Timing). With
demand for a single non-verifiable task and no explicit contracting on other tasks, if
actions are sequential and the principal moves first (Stage Game 2), a relational con-
tract to sustain positive levels of the non-contractible task is sustainable in equilibrium
iﬀ:
ΦSTSeq (b δ) ≡ δvB(b)− cB(b) ≥ 0 (7)
where, from (5), ΦSTSeq (b) ≥ ΦSTSml (b).
Proof. With sequential timing following Stage game 2, the set of sustainable
relational contracts satisfies (IRST-P), (IRST-α) and and (RICST-α). However, when
(RICST-α) is satisfied, (IRST-α) is also satisfied. Thus we can ignore (IRST-α). Noting
that (RICST-α) is easier to satisfy the higher is tB, the set of sustainable b is maximized
at the maximum tB compatible with (IRST-P), which gives tB = vB(b). Substituting
for tB = vB(b) in (RICST-α) we obtain expression (7).
Since there is no need to incentives the principal, no rent for the principal is needed.
The set of eﬀort level sustainable in equilibrium under standard relational contracting
with sequential actions is then always strictly larger than under simultaneous actions,
as it happens in a repeated ’trust game’ if compared to a payoﬀ-equivalent repeated
simultaneous actions Prisoner’s Dilemma game. That is
bSTSeq (δ) ≥ bSTSml (δ) and δSTSeq < δSTSml.
Remark 1 In the sequential game we have assumed that first the principal pays tB
and then the agent chooses task intensity. As the only possible deviation is from the
agent, giving all the surplus to the agent by setting tB = vB(b), minimizes the gain
from defection. If we invert the sequence of moves, as in Stage Game 3, the relevant
constraint becomes (RIC-P). The set of sustainable actions remains the same but it is
now found by setting tB = cB(b) and thus giving all the surplus to the principal.
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3 Bureaucratic Control: (Over)Contracting on A
to Obtain B
Suppose our principal is a manager of a large organization subject to regulatory or
governance rules that do not allow to operate discretionary payments tB that are not
part of an explicit contract, say because it would be too hard then to prevent some
dishonest agents present in the population to unduly appropriate part of the transfer.
In this example we will define this common practice by two assumptions very close to
many real world situations. ‘Bureaucratic Control’ (BC):
BC1. With BC, it is forbidden for the principal to operate ’discretionary transfers’,
i.e. transfers that are not justified by an explicit contract detailing what was that
transfer paid for, and renegotiating publicly awarded explicit contract is forbidden.
This type of control rule, used in most large hierarchical organizations to facilitate
internal monitoring, excludes payments against any non-verifiable services/actions, like
tB. It only allows for monetary transfers, like pB, prescribed by an explicit contract
detailing for what kind of (contractible) good of service is exchanged against the mon-
etary transfer.
BC2. Monitoring coincidence between payments and explicit contracts in the books
is easy and cheap (e.g. through book audits) and it is always done; monitoring contract
implementation, i.e. verifying whether the goods or service explicitly contracted upon
have been eﬀectively delivered at the quality levels the contract prescribed, is extremely
costly/diﬃcult and it is never done.
In what follows the presence of BC will mean that these two assumptions are both
satisfied. They bring to the limit, for the sake of crispness of our example, the rather
obvious observation that checking whether books are correct, i.e. that to each payment
corresponds an explicit contract, is much cheaper and is done much more often in
organization than checking whether the explicit contracts have then been eﬀectively
managed/applied with the due care to obtain all what was paid for at the agreed quality
level.
Suppose now that the principal is subject to BC, so that it cannot operate discre-
tionary payments that are not part of an explicit contract. With BC imposing tB = 0,
standard relational contracts on task B become unfeasible: the agent will never provide
eﬀort b given that he cannot be compensated for it. To emphasize:
Lemma 3 (Bureaucratic Control). With the principal subject to BC and demand
for a single non-verifiable task, standard relational contracting cannot sustain any trade
in equilibrium, i.e. ΦBCSeq = ΦBCSml = ∅.
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However, parties under BC can circumvent the reduction of discretion by writing
an explicit contract on some other verifiable task A, that for now we make not valuable
by assumption (we show later that this is indeed optimal), and use that to motivate
the agent to provide the valuable but non-contractible task B.
For example, suppose there is only one valuable and non-verifiable task B. Then
the principal and the agent can sign a long-term explicit contract Φ =
©
a, pA, Fα, FP
ª
on some verifiable task A such that vA(a) = 0 for any level of A and cA(0) = 0,
c0A(a) > 0, c
00
A(a) > 0. The transfer in this ’indirect’ relational contract is then pA,
which compensates the agent for his provision of costly b > 0. The principal and the
agent can then also implicitly agree on a relational contract prescribing a = 0 and b > 0
on the equilibrium path, sustained by the threat of enforcing the explicit contract in
case a defection is observed. Thus, the principal’s grim trigger strategy is: if the agent
deviates in the current period, the principal will implement the contract and demand
task intensity a on task A forever after, imposing fines Fα whenever that task is not
delivered. The agent’s grim strategy is: if the principal deviates in the current period,
the agent will not exert b ever again in the future. In the punishment phase, the explicit
contract is enforced: the principal will (have to) pay pA to the agent or incur fine FP
and the agent will exert a or incur fine Fα.8
In this case the participation constraints of the principal and the agent are respec-
tively given by
IRBC − P : vB(b)− pA
1− δ ≥ 0,
and
IRBC − α : pA − cB(b)
1− δ ≥ 0.
Note that under the explicit contract payment is non-discretionary. Then the prin-
cipal can only profitably defect from the relational contract by levying the fine Fα on
the agent at the end of the stage game for not having delivered the explicitly con-
tracted intensity a.9 After such a defection, the principal will have to pay pA forever
after (optimal if FP ≥ pA), in exchange for the valueless a, or otherwise pay the fine FP
(optimal if FP < pA). Therefore, the relational incentive constraints of the principal is
RICBC − P : vB(b)− pA
1− δ ≥ vB(b)− pA + F
α −
δmin
£
pA, FP
¤
1− δ . (8)
Conversely, the agent can profitably defect from the relational contract by not providing
b, but then he will have to simultaneously provide a (optimal if Fα ≥ cA(a)) or pay
8Note that since pA must be paid regardless of whether the agent exerts eﬀort b, the distinction
we made about simoultaneous and sequential ceases to be relevant under BC.
9Deviating by not paying the transfer pA(aE) at the beiginning is not profitable, as then P will
not deliver bI and will also exercise the penalty FG.
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the fine Fα (optimal if Fα < cA(a)). Therefore, the relational incentive constraints of
the agent is
RICBC − α : pA − cB(b)
1− δ ≥ pA −min [F
α, cA(a)] + δ
pA −min [Fα, cA(a)]
1− δ . (9)
We then obtain the following Lemma:
Lemma 4 (Optimality of Low Fines). The set of sustainable relational contracts
with explicit overcontracting is non-empty and it is maximized by setting the fines at
the minimum level necessary to induce compliance with the explicit contract, i.e. Fα =
cA(a) and FP = pA.
Proof. Summing up (RICBC-P) in (8) and (RICBC-P) in (9), we obtain
RICBC :
vB(b)− cB(b)
1− δ ≥ vB(b) + F
α −
δmin
£
pA, FP
¤
1− δ −
min [Fα, cA(a)]
1− δ + δ
pA
1− δ .
By inspection, FP should be maximized, as it appears with a negative sign on the
RHS of RIC; thus FP = pA. Now suppose Fα < cA(a), then RIC becomes
vB(b)− cB(b)
1− δ ≥ vB(b)−
δFα
1− δ
and as Fα appears with a negative sign on the right hand side of RIC, the set of
sustainable constraints increases by raising Fα up to cA(a).
Lemma 4 provides a novel rationale for fines to be bounded above. The value of
fines is to induce the parties to comply with the explicit contract in the punishment
phase. There is no need for the fines to penalize the parties by imposing a cost that
goes beyond the cost of compliance because non-compliance is perfectly detectable and
there is nothing that fines can do which could not be done within the contract. Setting
the fines higher than the cost of compliance for a party would reduce the feasibility
of relational contracting by giving incentives to the other party to defect from the
relational contract to cash the fine.
In the light of Lemma 4, the two relational constraints reduce to
RI˜CBC − P : δ
1− δvB(b) ≥ cA(a), (10)
and
RI˜CBC − α : cA(a) ≥ cB(b). (11)
Consider (RI˜C-P). By cooperating, the principal gains the surplus vB(b) from the
valuable task in all future periods and gives up the gain from levying the fine Fα = cA(a)
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in the current period. Consider (RI˜C-α). By cooperating, the agent incurs the cost
cB(b) of undertaking the non-verifiable task B whilst it saves on the cost cA(a) of
undertaking the explicitely-contracted task A, in the current and in future periods.
The relational constraints are independent of pA since pA must be paid regardless of
whether b is performed.
The following Proposition is then obtained.
Proposition 1 (The Value of Overcontracting Under BC). With the principal
subject to BC, explicit (over-)contracting on a valueless but verifiable task A acts as
a threat that allows to sustain otherwise unfeasible relational contracts, implementing
positive levels of the valuable but non-verifiable task B. The set of implementable task
intensity satisfies
ΦBC (b, δ) ≡ δvB(b)− cB(b) (1− δ) ≥ 0. (12)
with the highest implementable b, bBC(δ), implemented by choosing intensity of task A
such that cA(aBC) = cB(bBC).
Proof. The set of feasible relational contracts with overcontracting maximizes b
subject to (IRBC-P), (IRBC-α), (RI˜CBC-α) and (RI˜CBC-P). Since pA only aﬀects (IRBC-
P), (IRBC-α), any pA ∈ [cB(b), vB(b)] is feasible. Now let bBC(δ) denote the highest
sustainable b.We show that at bOV , both (RI˜CBC-α) and (RI˜CBC-P) must be binding.
Suppose by contradiction that (RI˜CBC-P) is binding whilst (RI˜CBC-α) is slack. Then
cA(a) can be reduced so as to keep (RICBC-α) satisfied whilst loosening (RI˜CBC-P),
making higher levels of b implementable: a contradiction. Suppose next that (RICBC-
α) is binding whilst (RI˜CBC-α) is slack. Then, we can increase b and a so as to
leave (RI˜CBC-α) binding and keep (RI˜CBC-P) satisfied. Setting both (RI˜CBC-α) and
(RI˜CBC-P ) binding we obtain expression (12).
Proposition 1 provides a rationale as to why explicit contracts can be signed but not
applied, particularly when the principals in these contracts are members of a large hier-
archical organizations, like Civil Servants procuring for a Government or Procurement
Managers of large firms. Overcontracting can be a means to sustain relational con-
tracting when discretionary transfers are not allowed. With overcontracting on tasks
that are verifiable, costly to the agent but of no use for the principal, the principal
can exchange discretionally the non-implementation of such explicit contract against
the provision of non contractible tasks that are costly to the agent and valuable for
the principal. Of course, all this relies on our choice to focus on ’benevolent’ em-
ployees or civil servants. As mentioned in introduction, the same strategies could be
used by non-benevolent employees to enforce implicit corrupt deals trading contract
non-enforcements against bribes or private benefits B.
We have so far assumed that the verifiable task A, contracted upon to induce eﬀort
on task B, is valueless to the principal. The Proposition below shows however that
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when explicit contracts are only used as threats, it is indeed optimal to write the
contract on tasks that are valueless to the principal as this helps to enlarge the set of
sustainable relational contracts under BC.
Proposition 2 With the principal subject to BC, other things equal, the set of sus-
tainable task intensity that is achievable through overcontracting on a verifiable task A
is maximized when A is valueless to the principal.
Proof. Let vA(a) denote the value of the verifiable task A. The relational contract
of the principal modifies to
RICBC − P : vB(b)− pA
1− δ ≥ vB(b)− pA + F
α +
vA(a)− δmin
£
pA, FP
¤
1− δ .
whilst vA(a) has no eﬀect on (RICBC-P),(IRBC-P) and (IRBC-α). Since the LHS of
(RICBC-P) is independent of vA(a) whilst the RHS is increasing in vA(a) and since the
set of sustainable relational contracts is maximized when (RICBC-P) binds, the result
follows.
Intuitively, if task A were valuable to the principal, the principal would have more
to gain from defaulting by enforcing the explicit contract. His payoﬀ in the punishment
phase would therefore increase, thus reducing the gain from sticking to the relational
contract.
4 The General Value of Contracts as Threats
The results in the previous section show that explicit contracting on a non-valuable task
can make relational contracts sustainable when discretionary transfers are not allowed.
In fact we now show that this overcontracting might facilitate relational contracts on
valuable but non-contractible tasks even in the absence of bureaucratic control.
Assuming away BC and maintaining for the moment the assumption that rene-
gotiation is prohibitively costly, consider the optimal relational contract when both
discretionary transfers and overcontracting are allowed (BC). Without loss of general-
ity, with regard to the timing of the discretionary payment tB we focus on the case of
simultaneous timing (Stage game 1).
Keeping the same notation as in the previous section, with discretionary transfers
and overcontracting the participation constraints become
IROV − P : vB(b)− pA − tB
1− δ ≥ 0,
IROV − α : tB + pA − cB(b)
1− δ ≥ 0.
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Suppose now that tB ≥ 0 : the discretionary transfer takes the form of a payment from
the principal to the agent. A deviation by the principal then consists in not paying
tB when b was observed and in levying the fine Fα on the agent for not exerting a. A
deviation by the agent consists in exerting a (or incurring the fine) instead of exerting
b. The relational incentive constraints are therefore
RICOV − P : vB(b)− pA − tB
1− δ ≥ vB(b)− pA + F
α −
δmin
£
pA, FP
¤
1− δ (13)
and
RICOV−α : tB + pA − cB(b)
1− δ ≥ tB+pA−min [F
α, cA(a)]+δ
pA −min [Fα, cA(a)]
1− δ . (14)
Summing up the two constraints, substituting for the optimal fines (Lemma 4 still
applies) and simplifying, we obtain
RICOV : δvB(b)− cB(b)− (1− δ) tB + δcA(a) ≥ 0 (15)
Since LHS of RIC decreases with tB and it is unaﬀected by pA, the set of sustainable
relational contracts is maximized at tB = 0 with pA chosen so as to satisfy IROVs.
Compared to (RICST) under standard relational contracting (expression 6), there is an
additional positive term, δcA(a), which is the cost of deviation for the agent given by
the cost of complying with the explicit contract. This leads us to the following Lemma.
Lemma 5 (Sub-optimality of Discretionary Transfers). With overcontracting,
discretionary transfers are suboptimal: in any relational eﬃcient equilibrium tB = 0.
Proof. Suppose that tB ≤ 0. In this case a deviation by the principal only results in
the levying of the fine; since tB is non-positive, it is the agent who can withhold payment
to the principal and not vice versa. The relational incentive constraints therefore
become
RI˜COV − P : vB(b)− pA − tB
1− δ ≥ vB(b)− tB − pA + F
α −
δmin
£
pA, FP
¤
1− δ
and
RI˜COV − α : tB + pA − cB(b)
1− δ ≥ pA −min [F
α, cA(a)] + δ
pA −min [Fα, cA(a)]
1− δ .
Summing up these two constraints, we have
RICOV : δvB(b) + (1− δ)tB − cB(b) + δcA(a) ≥ 0
and the set of sustainable relational contracts is maximized at tB = 0.
Before giving the intuition for the above Lemma, we state the following Proposition.
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Proposition 3 (Rewarding A to Obtain B with no BC) (i) Explicit (over-)contracting
on a valueless but verifiable task allows to sustain higher levels of the valuable and
non-verifiable task than standard relational contracting under either sequential or si-
multaneous timing. The set of sustainable relational contracting is given by
ΦOV (b, δ) ≡ ΦBC (b) ≡ δvB(b)− cB(b) (1− δ) ≥ 0, (16)
with the highest implementable b, bOV (δ), obtained by choosing intensity of task A such
that cA(aOV ) = cB(bOV ) and solving ΦOV
¡
bOV , δ
¢
= 0. (ii) The set of feasible relational
contracting under overcontracting is strictly greater than under standard relational con-
tracting:
ΦOV (b, δ) > ΦSTSeq (b, δ) > Φ
ST
Sml (b, δ) .
Proof. Substitute for tB = 0 in (15) and note that expression (15) is increasing
in cA(a). Since (RICOV-α) in expression (14) reduces to cA(a) ≥ cB(b) and since (11)
is independent of cA(a), it follows that the set of feasible contracts is maximized at
cA(a) = cB(b). This gives ΦOV (b, δ).
Compared to standard relational contracting, overcontracting generates two eﬀects.
First, it introduces the agent’s obligation to comply with the explicit contract (or
pay the fine) and it gives the principal the ability to levy the fine after observing
whether the agent complied with the implicit contract. By allowing the principal to
react immediately to a deviation by the agent, overcontracing generates a sequentiality
that weakly reduces the agent’s gains from defection (strictly when the stage game is
simultaneous). Through an appropriate choice of the cost of compliance, this eﬀect can
completely remove the incentives of the agent to default. In particular, by choosing
intensity of task A such that cA(aOV ) = cB(bOV ), the agent is made indiﬀerent between
complying with the implicit contract and exert bOV and defaulting and exert aOV (or
pay the fine Fα = cA(aOV )) . Other things equal, overcontracting can therefore do at
least as well as standard relational contracting with sequential timing where the agent
moves first and only (RIC-P) matters.
Second, overcontracting aﬀects payoﬀs in the punishment phase starting in the
period after a defection takes place. By requiring parties to comply with a wasteful ex-
plicit contract, overcontracting strengthens the punishment phase. This eﬀect explains
why overcontracting can do also strictly better than standard relational contracting
with sequential timing.
By creating - through sequentiality - a cost of defaulting for the agent, and by
strengthening the punishment phase, the use of explicit contracts as threats is more
eﬃcient for sustaining relational contracting than the use of discretionary transfers.
The positive non-pecuniary eﬀect of overcontracting as an ’ineﬃcient threat’ (the sec-
ond eﬀect described above), is related to the positive eﬀect of ’money burning’ in
Clark-Grooves-Vikery mechanisms and relational contracting models with subjective
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evaluation, like McLeod (2003), Levine (2003), and Fuchs (2007); and it is reminding
of the positive eﬀect of ineﬃcient ownership structures on investment in long term re-
lationships with ’hold up’ problems, stressed by Halonen (2002) with respect to joint
ownership and generalized by Blonski and Spagnolo (2004).
5 Renegotiation and Short Term Contracts
In the basic model we have assumed that the parties can commit to long-term explicit
contracts. We now consider the possibility that explicit contracts can be renegotiated at
low cost later than period 0 and in particular after a defection from a relational contract
is observed. Clearly, this possibility has no eﬀect under standard relational contracting
as no explicit contracting is present. Consider therefore the case of overcontracting on
a to sustain otherwise unfeasible levels of b. We will discuss both long and short-term
contracts.
In the long-term contracting case studied in the previous sections, if renegotiation
costs are suﬃciently small, after an implicit contract breaks up because of a defection,
it is eﬃcient for the principal and the agent to renegotiate the explicit contract to a = 0,
given that task a is costly but valueless. Let z > 0 denote the cost of renegotiating the
explicit contract. Then in the renegotiation the principal and the agent will bargain
to share the gain from not implementing the ineﬃcient explicit contract net of the
renegotiation cost: δcA(a)
1−δ − z. When z ≥
δcA(a)
1−δ at cA (a) = cB(b), we are in the
situation of Section 4, so we focus here on z < δcB(b
OV )
1−δ .
Assuming 0 ≤ z < δcA
1−δ and Nash bargaining in the renegotiation phase, the agent
obtains
δ (pA − cA)
1− δ +
1
2
µ
δcA
1− δ − z
¶
=
δ
¡
pA − 12cA
¢
1− δ −
z
2
,
whilst the principal obtains
−δpA
1− δ +
1
2
µ
δcA
1− δ − z
¶
= −
δ
¡
pA − 12cA
¢
1− δ −
z
2
.
Therefore, the relational incentive constraints of the principal and the agent become
respectively (fines are unchanged)
RIˆCOV − P : vB(b)− pA
1− δ ≥ vB(b)− pA + cA(a)− δ
pA − 12cA(a)
1− δ −
z
2
RIˆCOV − α : pA − cB(b)
1− δ ≥ pA − cA(a) + δ
pA − 12cA(a)
1− δ −
z
2
(17)
We then obtain the following Lemma.
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Lemma 6 With overcontracting and renegotiation cost of z, the set of sustainable
relational contracts is given by
ΦOV (b, δ) = δvB(b)− cB(b) (1− δ) ≥ 0
ΦˆOV (b, δ, z) ≡ δvB(b)− cB(b) + (1− δ)z ≥ 0
⎧
⎨
⎩
if
δcB(bOV )
1−δ ≥ z,
if
δcB(bOV )
1−δ < z
. (18)
where Φ˜OV (b, δ, z) is increasing in z with
Φ˜OV (b, δ, zv) ≤ ΦOV (b) .
The level of overcontracting, cA (b)− cB (b) , is non-increases in z.
Proof. Suppose that δcB(bˆ
OV )
1−δ ≥ z. The two relational constraints simplify to
RIˆCOV − P : δvB(b) ≥ cA(a)
µ
1− δ
2
¶
− (1− δ)z
2
,
and
RIˆCOV − α : cA(a)
µ
1− δ
2
¶
≥ cB(b)− (1− δ)
z
2
.
Following the same reasoning as in Proposition 1, the set of sustainable relational
contracts is found by choosing a and b such that (RÎCOV -α) and (RÎCOV -P) are binding.
This gives a and b solving
cA(aˆOV )
µ
1− δ
2
¶
= cB(bˆOV )− (1− δ)
z
2
,
δvB(bˆOV )− cB(bˆOV ) + (1− δ)z = 0.
with δ
1−δcA(aˆ
OV ) − z = 2δcB(bOV )−z(1−δ)
(1−δ)(2−δ) which is positive for
δcB(bˆOV )
1−δ ≥ z. Thus the
above is a solution for
δcB(bˆOV )
1−δ ≥ z. Suppose now that
δcB(bˆOV )
1−δ < z. Then the parties
will prefer not to renegotiate the contract during the punishment phase and the analysis
is equivalent to the case developed in Section 4. Thus the set of feasible relational
contracts is then given by (16).
By increasing the payoﬀs of the parties in the punishment phase, renegotiation
reduces the sustainability of relational contracts with overcontracting. As payoﬀs raise
more the lower is the renegotiation cost, the set ΦˆOV (b, δ, z) of sustainable relational
contracts shrinks as z decreases.
As for other ineﬃcient contractual devices delivering strategic advantages, like
strategic delegation contracts, the possibility of renegotiating at low costs tends to
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undermine the benefit of the arrangement (see e.g. Dewatripont 1988, and Katz 2001).
For example, in Halonen (2002) the positive eﬀect of joint ownership is the smaller
the lower are renegotiation costs, and the eﬀect vanishes all together when the rene-
gotiation cost is zero. Similarly, Kocksen and Ok (2004) found recently additional
strategic eﬀects of contractual delegation, but only with costly renegotiation. These
eﬀects vanish when renegotiation becomes costless.
However, in our setup, even in the degenerate case of z = 0, renegotiation does
not completely eliminate the value of overcontracting. This is due to the first eﬀect
of overcontracting described above, namely the ability of overcontracting to create
sequentiality when the original stage game is simultaneous. Indeed, by inspection,
at z = 0, Φ˜OV (z = 0, b) = ΦSTSeq (z = 0, b) in (7). The following Proposition is then
obtained.
Proposition 4 (Overcontracting with Renegotiation). Renegotiation reduces the
set of sustainable relational contracts sustainable with overcontracting, the more the
lower the renegotiation cost z. However: (i) As long as z 6= 0, overcontracting strictly
dominates standard relational contracting, as ΦzOv (b) > ΦSeq (b) > ΦSml (b) . (ii) At
z = 0, overcontracting weakly dominates standard relational contracting, and strictly
dominates it when the timing of the stage game is simultaneous or if there is BC.
Proposition 4 stems from a combination of two factors. First, when renegotiation
occurs, the agent bears a cost of defaulting which is given by the cost of complying with
the explicit contract at the time of defaulting. Second, such cost is endogenous: when
renegotiation becomes less costly, the parties can design a more demanding explicit
contract so as to leave the payoﬀ of the agent unchanged. Thus, regardless of the cost
of renegotiation, the agent can be given incentives not to default.
In our simple framework we also obtain this result when only one-period explicit
contracts are available.
Corollary 1 The set of sustainable relational contracts with overcontracting when only
short term contracts are possible is the same as that with long-term overcontracting and
costless renegotiation (z = 0). Hence, also when only short term contracts exist over-
contracting weakly dominates standard relational contracting, and strictly dominates it
when the timing of the stage game must be simultaneous or if there is BC.
Proof. Suppose now that the principal and the agent agree to a short term con-
tract and to renegotiate it as long as parties do not defect. The relational incentive
constraints of the principal and the agent become respectively (fines are unchanged)
RICOVShort − P :
vB(b)− pA
1− δ ≥ vB(b)− pA + cA,
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and
RICOVShort − α :
pA − cB(b)
1− δ ≥ pA − cA(a).
Simplifying
RICOVShort − P : δ (vB(b)− pA)− cA (1− δ) ≥ 0
and
RICOVShort − α : δpA − cB(b) + cA (1− δ) ≥ 0.
The set of relational contracts is maximized by setting cB(b) = cA = pA, which yields
ΦOVShort (b) ≡ δvB(b)− cB(b) ≥ 0,
which is equal to ΦOV (b) , the set of sustainable relational contracts with long-term
contracting and renegotiation, given by (18). This proves the first statement. The
second follows directly from the Proposition.
6 Distributional Eﬀects and Financing Constraints
In this section we make the extreme assumption that renegotiation is costless (or that
only one-period explicit contracts can be signed), and show that even with sequen-
tial timing there might still be reasons for using overcontracting to sustain relational
contracts.
Distributional eﬀects. Overcontracting has important distributional consequences.
In standard relational contracting, an agent who gets no surplus gets no long-term
benefit from continuing the contract, and will therefore default if the timing of the
exchange cannot be properly adjusted. Indeed, without overcontracting the condition
tB ≥ cB(b)/δ is necessary for (RICST-α) to be satisfied, if for any reason the timing of
the exchange must follow Stage Game 1 or 2. Thus, under standard relational con-
tracting, the agent must be given a rent of at least (1− δ)cB/δ. Under overcontracting,
instead, an agent who gets no surplus can still get a long-term benefit from continuing
the contract because there is a cost of defaulting. In the case of no renegotiation,
for example, when the agent defaults he triggers the implementation of the explicit
contract, which costs him cA(a) (or the correspondent fine Fα). Since defaulting saves
the agent the amount cB(b), choosing a such that cA(a) = cB(b) suﬃces to remove any
incentive to default. We then obtain:
Corollary 2 Even if z = 0 or only short term contracts are available, if the timing of
the exchange follows Stage Game 1 or 2 overcontracting on A allows the principal
to implement any level of B that is feasible under standard relational contracting whilst
retaining a greater share of the surplus. With overcontracting, no rent is needed to
discipline the agent.
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Proof. (i) Consider the case of overcontracting with no renegotiation. We know
from the Proof of Proposition 1 that the set of sustainable relational contracts is max-
imized by choosing a such that cA(a) = cB(b). The result then follows by noting
that (RICBC-α) in expression (9) is satisfied at pA(b) = cA(a) = cB(b) and fines
satisfying Lemma 4. (ii) Now consider the case of renegotiation. We know from
Lemma 6 that the set of sustainable relational contracts is maximized by choosing
a such that cA(a)
¡
1− δ
2
¢
= cB(b) − (1− δ) z2 . The result then follows by noting
that (RÎCOV-α) in expression (17) is satisfied at pA(b) = cB(b) and a such that
cA(a)
¡
1− δ
2
¢
= cB(b)− (1− δ) z2 .
Financing constraints. This same ability of overcontracting to solve problems
linked to the sequence of exchange has also important eﬀects when there are financial
constraints that prevent agents to implement the eﬃcient sequence of the exchange.
Suppose, for example, that the principal has all bargaining power and therefore is
the residual claimant of the future rent from the relationship. Suppose further that
the task is a nonverifiable but costly, and that the agent does not have own money
to finance such an investment and is financially constrained (cannot borrow it). Since
the principal has the bargaining power, we know that it would be eﬃcient that he
requires the agent to invest first, according to Stage Game 3. However, if the agent
is financially constrained, it will not be able to invest first and an ineﬃcient timing
will have to be chosen that will also cost the principal part of the obtainable rent, as
shown by the Corollary above.
Overcontracting on a useless but verifiable task, even if z = 0 or only short term
contracts are available, allows to solve the problem thanks to its distributional eﬀects.
It allows the principal to pay first pA to the agent, which allows the agent to finance the
agreed upon investment b, without inducing any ineﬃciency and rent redistribution.
We thus have:
Corollary 3 Even if z = 0 or only short term contracts are available, overcontracting
allows to sustain an eﬃcient relational contracts when financing constraints would not
allow it otherwise.
7 Conclusions
We have shown that explicit contracts can not only be seen as safe "boundaries" within
which relational contracts operate better, as suggested by Klein (2000), or as con-
straints on discretion that hinder relational contracting, as suggested by Bernheim and
Whinston (1998), but also as credible "threats" that - not being applied - actively help
governing relationships. When this is the case, overcontracting may be observed, as
explicit and not applied contracts on verifiable tasks with little value oﬀer discretionary
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actions (legal penalties) may enforce better relationships than standard relational con-
tracts. This result could explain some cases in which we observe that explicit contracts
regulate and reward apparently useless tasks and are not actually applied, and can
be seen as the complement to the undercontracting result in Bernheim and Whinston
(1998), where explicit contracting on valuable tasks is reduced to facilitate relational
contracts. Both these results are based on externalities between contractible and non-
contractible tasks, and therefore open the way to many new questions on optimal job
and organizational design.
Also, as mentioned earlier, we have been mainly focussing on legal and productive
noncontractible tasks B (or eﬀort, or investments). However, illegal tasks, bribes and
private benefits also cannot be explicitly contracted (since they are forbidden, they
cannot be brought in front of a court), so that overcontracting may help to sustain
corrupt relational exchanges exactly as it helps productive ones. The trade oﬀ between
the positive and negative eﬀects of overcontracting, and the optimal regulatory response
to it in diﬀerent legal and cultural environments appears therefore and important
question to address in future work.
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